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Abstract 
Cost sharing represent a well-established tool for the control of health care demand in many Oecd countries, 
even though it is used with caution, and in combination with other instruments, in order to avoid potential 
negative impacts on access to essential health care services. Waiting lists and waiting times represent an 
alternative (and implicit) way to control demand in public health care systems, even though rationing by waiting 
may be an inferior solution to cost-sharing in terms of welfare. 
This paper focuses on the use of waiting times, cost-sharing, and other tools (in particular, priority and 
appropriateness criteria) in order to control demand for a public outpatient health service in presence of a fully 
paid out-of-pocket private alternative. We develop an agent-based model where heterogeneous agents maximise 
their individual utility based on income and health status. On this basis, we develop some computational 
experiments based on micro-simulations that offer some useful insights for health care policy. In particular, we 
show that: i) the presence of a private alternative to public treatment can improve social welfare and health 
equity in a NHS, when public supply is constrained by a fixed budget and longer waiting times than the private 
one; ii) using prioritisation of waiting lists without any copayment to control the demand for public treatment 
may produce high performances in terms of social welfare, health equality and policy efficiency; iii) applying a 
moderate copayment rate as a tool to control public demand could determine the same policy efficiency of using 
only priority lists, if the copayment revenues are used to fund the public provision. 
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1. Introduction1 
The increase in health care expenditure is mostly determined both by demographic and 
technological factors, essentially population ageing and the extension of the options of care 
allowed by scientific advance; though the growing of expenditure is also connected to 
economic factors, such as the increase in per capita income. In last years, the set of health care 
services with price-elastic demand and with many therapeutic substitutes has greatly grown. 
Whether these services are not given a price, health care system will be exposed to a risk of 
excess demand, which can be particularly high due to the presence of supply induced demand 
typical of health care market. Since the 80’s, many health care systems adopted several 
measures either on the supply side or on demand side, in order to control both autonomous 
and induced excess consumption of health care services. Sometime these policies affected the 
degree of equity in the access to health care. 
On the supply side, control instruments change following a dynamic learning process in order 
to increase the effectiveness of controlling expenditure. It is likely that incentives to 
producers’ efficiency become more important than traditional measures such as expenditure 
ceilings and budget constraints. Moreover, the definition of the precise range of covered 
services (e.g., basic levels of health care insured by a National Health Service) will become 
increasingly important, in order to control a demand which tends to grow far beyond the 
boundaries of evidence-based medicine (EBM). In a same way, private health care insurances 
will tend to segment supplied coverages, with considerable premium variations.  
On the demand side, control tools can be either direct or indirect and both can be used at 
aggregated level or at micro-level (i.e. at local health unit or health care professional’s level). 
Direct tools aim at controlling the demand autonomously expressed by patients, which is not 
(or not completely) influenced by health care professionals. Indirect tools affect health care 
professionals but, on the same time, they indirectly aim at steering and selecting demand 
according to appropriateness and priority criteria. 
Cost-sharing and rationing by waiting times are the most frequently used instruments for 
direct control of health care demand within public health care systems even though they may 
determine negative effects in terms of equity and allocative efficiency. Besides these 
traditional instruments of economic and real rationing, there are other important policy tools 
for controlling health care demand: direct tools such as health education and indirect tools 
such as the incentives for general practitioners, the adoption of appropriateness criteria 
                                                 
1 Paper presented at the XVI Conference of the Italian Health Economics Association (AIES), Naples, September 
29-30, 2011. 
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according to EBM), and prioritising waiting lists. 
In this paper we use an agent-based model (ABM) to analyse the impact of two direct tools 
(rationing through waiting times and cost-sharing) and two indirect tools (appropriateness and 
priority criteria) to control the demand for a public outpatient service provided by a National 
Health Service in presence of a fully paid out-of-pocket private alternative. In particular, we 
develop a ABM model where heterogeneous agents maximise their individual utility based on 
income, health level, and other individual characteristics such as risk aversion and the relative 
preference for health with respect to income. We also analyse the implications, in terms of 
efficiency and equity, of adopting different sets of policy tools in order to control the demand 
for the public outpatient service. 
Multi-agent models have been applied increasingly in economic and organisational research 
and they have been also used to analyse health care organisations (e.g. see Moreno-Nealon, 
2003; Vermeulen et al., 2007; Daknou et al., 2008; Laskowsky et al. 2009). ABM approach 
allows to explore several issues that are difficult to deal with in analytical models, such as 
repeated and dynamic interaction among heterogeneous decision-making agents and between 
the agents and their environment (Wooldridge, 2002).2 Therefore, this approach seems 
particularly well suited to model waiting times of heterogeneous patients to access public 
health care services characterised by capacity constraints and private alternatives. However, 
while a considerable focus of the literature has been on system-level performance dynamics, 
quantified in terms of patient safety, economic indicators, staff workload and patients’ flows, 
relatively little work exists in applying ABM to health care policy. 
Our model investigate the impact of individual agents’ characteristics and interaction between 
agents and health care providers (the NHS and private services) in a dynamic framework 
characterised by different tools to control the demand for the public service. On this basis, we 
develop some computational experiments based on micro-simulations that offer some useful 
insights for health care policy. In particular, we show that: i) the presence of a private 
alternative to public treatment can improve social welfare and health equity in a NHS, when 
public supply is constrained by a fixed budget and longer waiting times than the private one; 
ii) using prioritisation of waiting lists without any copayment to control the demand for public 
                                                 
2 The application of ABM in economic and organisational research has lead to the development of Agent-based 
Computational Economics (ACE), i.e. the computational study of economic processes modeled as dynamic 
systems of interacting agents who do not necessarily possess perfect rationality and information (Tesfatsion and 
Judd, 2006). Differently from standard economic models, ACE models focus on dynamic processes and local 
interactions among economic agents rather then equilibria. In contrast to the models of conventional simulation 
(e.g. system dynamics), in which participants are modeled in an aggregated way (top-down), in ACE models 
agents are treated individually (bottom-up approach) and this requires a detailed specifications of structural 
conditions, institutional arrangements, and behavioral hypotheses. 
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treatment may produce high performances in terms of social welfare, health equality and 
policy efficiency; iii) applying a moderate copayment rate as a tool to control public demand 
could determine the same policy efficiency of using only priority lists, if the copayment 
revenues are used to fund the public provision. 
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 provides a general analysis of the main direct 
and indirect tools for controlling health care demand in an NHS and focus, in particular, on 
the efficiency and equity implications of using waiting times to ration demand. In section 3, 
we present a multi-agent based model of demand for an outpatient health service provided by 
the NHS, and which is characterised by waiting times and cost-sharing arrangements in 
presence of a fully paid out-of-pocket private alternative. In section 4 we develop a particular 
specification of the model, based on several reasonable assumptions about the values to assign 
to the relevant variables, and provide some preliminary results of the effects of different 
simulations in terms of social welfare and equity. Lastly, section 5 reports some conclusions. 
 
2. Demand control within a NHS: the issue of waiting times 
Many public health care systems adopt several (and heterogeneous) measures on the demand 
side to control both autonomous and induced excess consumption of health care. The control 
of demand should aim to increase the effectiveness and appropriateness of the provided care, 
even though in many cases it is simply intended as a way to ration and limit expenditure. 
Table 1 reports the whole set of the main direct and indirect policy tools for the control of 
health care demand within a NHS. Direct tools aim at controlling the demand autonomously 
expressed by consumers, which is not (completely) influenced by physicians, while indirect 
tools can be used to control the demand mainly driven by health care professionals. The latter 
types of tools affect directly health care professionals but, on the same time, they indirectly 
aim at steering and selecting demand according to appropriateness and priority criteria. 
Cost-sharing and implicit rationing by waiting times are the most used (and analysed) 
instruments for the direct control of health care demand within public health care systems. 
Both instruments directly influence the demand variables and allow to control ex post moral 
hazard. Another traditional way to control demand is “real rationing”, i.e. the definition of 
quantitative limits to the access to public health care services. 
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Table 1 - Tools for demand control within a NHS 
Direct tools Indirect tools 
 
a) Cost-sharing 
 Coinsurance or Copayment 
 
b) Rationing: 
 Waiting times (implicit rationing, 
uneffective control…) 
 Quantitative limits to the access to public 
health care services 
 
c) Health care education 
 Social marketing for health promotion 
 Promotion of patient’s compliance and 
patient’s empowerment to improve 
correct self-medication  
 
 
d) Steering and selecting demand: 
 Empowerment and incentive for General 
Practitioners  as gatekeepers 
 Appropriateness criteria (EBM): Clinical 
guidelines; Diagnostic and therapeutic 
paths 
 Prioritising waiting lists (priority classes 
and indicators) 
 
 
The use of price (cost-sharing) as economic tool for limiting excess demand (moral hazard) is 
quite frequent in public health care systems. Cost-sharing can take on a number of forms (and 
these are often combined): deductible (an all-inclusive amount – either per case or per year - 
entirely paid by the patient before insurance cover begins); co-insurance (the percentage of 
the expenditure, beyond the deductible, which the patient must pay); copayment (the amount 
paid by the patient for a health service which is independent of the total cost of the service). 
Cost-sharing can be constrained by the degree of demand inelasticity and by its potential 
negative impact on access to health care services by particular categories of patients, with 
negative implications in term of health outcomes and equity.3 Usually, copayment or co-
insurance schemes are not well accepted owing to their regressivity and (according to some 
analysts) to their negative impact on preventive care, which could increase health care costs in 
the future (Rebba, 2009). Nevertheless, in many OECD countries cost-sharing represents a 
well-established tool for the control of health care demand, even though it is used with 
caution, and in combination with other instruments, in order to avoid potential negative 
impacts on access to essential healthcare services.4  
                                                 
3 Empirical analysis has shown that it is quite difficult to use cost-sharing in order to reduce only the 
consumption of health care treatments with a low “productivity” in terms of gained health. A proper use of 
copayments should attempt to minimise the risk of an indiscriminate reduction of health care consumption, 
avoiding to affect essential and appropriate care. On this point, the new approach of “value-based cost sharing” 
(Pauly e Blavin, 2008) seems to provide useful directions, pointing out that optimal cost-sharing should be 
designed considering not only the price elasticity of demand but also the cost-effectiveness of different 
treatments. 
4 In order to mitigate negative income effects, maximum ceilings in annual amount of cost- sharing can ensure 
that patients do not face “excessive” expenses during the year, thereby reducing uncertainty and risk. 
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Waiting times induce the elimination (or reduction) of public health care demand, not only by 
patients capable to turn to private health care services, but also by low income patients who 
forgo health care because waiting would determine a too high opportunity cost of time and/or 
a decay in their health level (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984; Martin and Smith, 1999; Cullis 
et al., 2000; Rebba, 2009). Under this perspective, also waiting times produce regressive 
effects. Moreover, in public health care systems, using waiting times as a rationing 
mechanism in substitution of cost-sharing, may be an inferior solution in terms of equity and 
allocative efficiency. In fact, using waiting times (rather than cost-sharing) as the unique tool 
to control the demand for public health care, on the one hand, can restrain an appropriate 
demand for public treatments even though it expresses a real need (likewise using cost-
sharing without any exemption), while on the other hand it provides a strong incentive to opt 
for alternative private treatments which are less (not) accessible to less wealthy people. These 
effects are illustrated in Figure 1 which represents a situation where only waiting times are 
used to control the demand for a completely free public health service in presence of a fully 
paid out-of-pocket private alternative which can be purchased at price P. Considering only the 
opportunity cost of waiting time C (the sum of income losses due to work stoppage before 
accessing the service, other costs born to access the service, and anxiety costs)5, a patient 
would choose to enter in the waiting list for the free public treatment only if the waiting time 
were lower than tD. But waiting too much can also reduce the benefit rising from the public 
treatment because of a decay in the patient’s health level: the money value of the health 
benefit of the treatment, starting from B0, decreases with time and falls below the price P of 
the alternative private treatment when the waiting time is higher than tA. If the waiting time 
for the public treatment were t° (where tA< t°<tD), the patient could immediately choose the 
fully paid private alternative even though her/his opportunity cost of time were lower than P 
at time t°. It follows that people with lower ability to pay could not access the private 
alternative and would be constrained either to wait in the public list or to forgo the treatment 
with a negative impact on their health status, i.e, with negative effects in terms of equity and 
allocative efficiency. 
 
                                                 
5 For empirical analyses of opportunity costs, see Acton (1975) and Propper (1995); the latter also analyse 
anxiety costs.  
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Figure 1 - Choice between a public treatment d a private alternative 
 
 
Besides traditional instruments of economic and real rationing, such as cost sharing and 
waiting times, there are other important direct tools for controlling health care demand which 
have been rather neglected by economic analysis. Among these tools one should consider 
better citizens’ information and health education, which can affect the variables inducing 
health care consumption (Muraro and Rebba, 2004) and can be promoted following two main 
strategies: 
 health prevention and modification of risky lifestyle through social marketing for 
public health (Siegel and Doner, 1998; Kotler et al., 2002) or “libertarian paternalism” 
policies (Le Grand, 2008; Le Grand and Srivastava 2009; Muraro and Rebba, 2010)6; 
 promoting patient’s compliance and patient’s empowerment within the relationship 
with health care services and professionals, through a correct use of self-diagnosis and 
of self-medication (Sindall, 2001). 
The policies adopted to pursue both strategies can determine relevant effects both on 
                                                 
6 Many developed countries have implemented innovative health marketing tools in order to promote safe 
lifestyles and reduce risk factors related to cardiovascular, neoplastic and respiratory diseases. The 
implementation of social marketing techniques to primary and secondary health prevention aims at providing 
incentives to voluntary giving up of unhealthy behaviours in order to increase individual and social welfare 
(control of ex ante moral hazard). While promoting prevention and correct lifestyles, one must also consider 
individual incentives and costs which are linked to the change of particular behaviours; moreover, the 
effectiveness of health marketing policies strongly depends on cooperation between health care agencies and 
other institutional players such as education and local authorities. 
C 
0 tD tA 
A D 
p 
0B  
t° time 
Cost and benefit of 
the treatment 
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allocative efficiency and on equity of access to health care. In particular, the empowerment of 
demand depends both on a more widespread information about health care and on socio-
cultural changes which partly modify the agency relationship between patients and physicians 
with a stronger role of patients, especially in their relationships with general practitioners.7 
Finally, as regards indirect control tools, particular policies can regulate and steer health care 
demand, reducing moral hazard and increasing appropriateness: 
 the empowerment of primary care services, providing the right incentives to general 
practitioners (contractual agreements between local health authorities and 
practitioners; cooperative agreements and networks of practitioners; empowerment of 
social and health care community districts); 
 the definition and implementation of appropriateness criteria according to EBM, in 
particular diagnostic and therapeutic paths and guidelines; 
 the definition of priority criteria for managing waiting lists of inpatient and outpatient 
services; prioritisation aims at regulating access to health care services according to 
clinical severity, emergency, or to other relevant variables, through either priority 
classes (homogeneous waiting groups) or priority indicators (Mullen, 2003; Mariotti, 
1999, 2006; Mariotti et al., 2008).  
The policy tools for indirect control of health care demand can be used for regulating the 
consumption induced by health care producers. These tools have become increasingly 
important as complement of direct policy tools. In fact, in many cases the derived demand of 
health care is influenced by the provider (in first place the doctor) who affects consumer’s 
preferences.  
Health economists have not developed yet a systematic analysis of the complete set of direct 
and indirect policy tools for the control of health care demand (reported in Table 1), and of 
their effects in terms of efficiency and equity. Only some recent contributions (Farnworth, 
2003; Gravelle and Siciliani, 2008; Siciliani, 2008; Felder, 2008) have considered the welfare 
                                                 
7 The empowerment of demand does not encompass all citizens and socio-demographic classes: asymmetry of 
information drawbacks in the patient-physician relationship are still important for elderly, low education and low 
income people (generally with lower ability to pay and higher information costs) and they should be reduced 
increasing the equity of access to health care services. Several studies have shown that a substantial 
improvement in general health status can be obtained by reducing existing inequalities in income, education, and 
access to information and new technologies, with a reduction of both the burden of disease among the more 
deprived groups and the overall health care needs (Marmot and Wilkinson, 1999; McIntyre and Mooney, 2007). 
Moreover, the conditions of access to health care have a very strong impact on the health inequalities between 
social groups: more deprived classes are less able to gain benefits from health care services (lower choice ability, 
lower probability to follow the right care path; lower ability to comply to preventive programs, more difficulties 
in the interaction with health care professionals, lower capacity to access to more innovative forms of care) 
(Kakwani et al., 1997; Van Doorslaer et al., 2004). 
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and equity implications of the combined choice of cost-sharing and waiting times when 
private health care services, alternative to public NHS services, are available. 
In the following section 3, we develop a multi-agent model to analyse the use of two direct 
tools (implicit rationing through waiting times and cost-sharing) and two indirect tools 
(appropriateness criteria and prioritisation of waiting lists) to control the demand for a public 
out-patient service in presence of a fully paid out-of-pocket private alternative. We ask 
whether it would desirable, from a societal point of view, to use both cost-sharing and waiting 
times in combination with other instruments (exemptions from copayment, priority classes or 
indicators, and appropriateness criteria), in order to reduce the typical negative effects on 
equity and efficiency of the two traditional direct tools of demand-control. 
 
3. The model 
We develop an agent-based model where heterogeneous agents maximise their individual 
utility based on income, the level of health, and other individual characteristics (risk aversion 
and the relative preference for health with respect to income). The agents’ utility is influenced 
by the access to an outpatient treatment which produces a health benefit and which can be 
obtained either from the NHS (free of charge or with a copayment T) or from a private 
provider (at full price). The fully paid private treatment is assumed to determine an higher 
individual expected benefit than the public treatment (owing to the full choice of 
professionals). Anyway, the access to private treatment is faster for two reasons: since a part 
of demand for private treatment is restrained by the payment of the full price p (while the 
public treatment is either free or charge or requires a copayment T < p); since we assume that 
private supply can satisfy a larger share of potential demand than public supply (the latter is 
constrained by the fixed NHS budget). It follows that in the public sector a longer waiting list 
will arise, with longer waiting times than in the private sector. 
This particular framework allows us to investigate the impact of individual agents’ 
characteristics and interaction between agents and health care providers (the NHS and private 
services) within a dynamic framework characterised by different tools to control the demand 
for the public treatment (specifically, rationing by waiting times, cost-sharing, appropriateness 
and priority criteria). On this basis, we develop some computational experiments based on 
micro-simulations that allows to analyse the efficiency and equity effects of different 
scenarios and offer some useful insights for health care policy . 
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3.1 Characteristics of individual agents 
Individual utility function 
We consider N heterogeneous individuals. Each individual i has an utility function: 
[1]  iiii HyUU ,,  
that depends on the yearly monetary income iy , the yearly stock of health iH , and a vector 
of K individual characteristics  Kikiii  ,...,....1 . We assume that  iy0  and 
10  iH . 
The functional form of the utility function is derived by means of the following four 
assumptions. 
Assumption  1 – positive marginal utility of income and health: 
[2] 0

y
i
U
y
U  and 0

H
i
U
H
U  
Assumption  2 – strict concavity: 
[3] 0

yy
i
y U
y
U
,  0

HH
i
H U
H
U  and 02  yHHHyy UUU  
Assumption  3 – minimum level of utility when 0iy  e 0iH : 
[4] ),0,0(min iUU   
Assumption  4 – minimum level of utility when 0iy  or 0iH : 
[5] minU ),0,0(),,0( ),0,( iiiii UHUyU    
A specification that satisfies all previous assumptions is: 
[6]   ),(),(,, iiiiiii HgyfHyU    
with 0,0  yyy ff , 0,0  HHH gg  and   ),0(),0(,0,0 iii gfU   .  
In particular we assume: 
[7]   iiii
i
i HyU




1  
1
1  
where  iii  , , ii
i
ii yyf




1
1
1),(  e )1(),( iiiii HHg
  . 
0i  is the relative risk aversion parameter and 0i  represents the relative intensity of 
individual preference about health with respect to net income. 
With this Cobb-Douglas-type utility function, strict concavity requires 11  i , 
1)1(  ii   and 1)1)(1(  ii  . 
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Parameters i  and i  are chosen by each individual, so utility functions are different across 
individuals, and are random numbers drawn from a uniform distribution in the range 
 maxmin ,  and  maxmin , . 
Furthermore, we assume that individuals consider a limited time horizon t  for their utility 
maximization (they are not completely rational). In particular, we assume t =365 days, then 
agents consider both income and health as referred to one year. 
 
Stock of health and benefit from the treatment 
At a given time 0t , the i-th agent has a health status 
0
iH , that she/he needs to improve (or not 
worsen) by receiving an outpatient treatment (e.g. an ambulatory service, a specialist visit, or 
a diagnostic treatment) with a potential benefit i  measured as an increase of the health 
status. The health benefit can be different depending on whether the treatment is provided by 
a public service (without any possibility of choice of the desired health care professional) or 
by a private one (with full choice of the desired professional). In particular we assume that, 
owing to the possibility of free choice of the desired professional, the effectiveness of the 
private service, measured by the parameter  , is 100%, while if the treatment is provided by a 
public service the benefit the effectiveness is lower: i.e. 10  . So the expected benefit i~  
depends on the chosen provider and is defined: 
[8] 




service public in the
service private in the~
i
i
i 
  
 
Then, we assume that i’s health decreases at an individual rate of decay i  per period 
(similarly to Lindsay-Feigenbaum, 1984), while, after the treatment, the agent can enjoy a 
constant level of health for the rest of the year. Therefore, if the treatment is obtained at time 
  (i.e. after   days), the individual stock of health at day t is: 
[9] 



 

 tifH
tifH
th
iii
t
ii
i )1)(~(
)1(
)( 0
0
 
The yearly stock of health is measured as the average value of all her/his daily health levels. 
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Assuming that the treatment occurs at time   (with 0< < t )8, the yearly stock of health can 
be defined as: 
[10] 

  


t
t
iii
t
t
ii
t
i
i HHtt
th
H
1
0
1
01 )1)(~()1(1
)(
)(



 = 
 


 )1)(~(1)1(11 00 iii
i
i
i Ht
H
t


   
The yearly stock of health )(iH  is represented by the grey area in Figure 2. 
To model the decay of health we assume that, without treatment, health decreases with time, 
reaching its minimum level minH  at time 
H
it : 
[11] 
d
iH
i HH
HHtttt 





minmax
min
0
minmaxmin )(  
where d is a parameter common for all individuals. The value of Hit  depends directly on the 
initial stock of health 0iH , so if the stock is very low, min
0 HHi  , then mintt Hi  , i.e. the 
stock of health decreases to minH  in a very short time. On the other hand, if health is very 
good, max
0 HHi  , the minimum stock of health is reached close to the maximum time 
maxtt
H
i  . 
Once Hit  is computed from the initial stock of health 
0
iH , it is possible to derive the 
individual rate of decay i : 
[12] 
H
it
i
i H
H
/1
0
min1 


  
Figure 3 shows the resulting decay of the health status when d =2, for some initial level of 
0
iH . The stock of health and the potential benefit are individual specific and are random 
numbers drawn from a uniform distribution in the range  maxmin , HH  and  maxmin , . 
 
                                                 
8 In other terms, we assume that the treatment occurs within one year. 
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Figure 2 - Time profile of the stock of health  
 
 
 
Figure 3 - Decay of health level for d=2 
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Income 
The i-th agent is endowed with a positive yearly income 0iy  and is characterised by an 
employment status, iS , defined as: 
 1 - self-employed 
 2 - employee 
 3 - without occupation (unemployed, retired, …). 
The individual employment status is randomly drawn from a distribution in which each status 
has a frequency jq , 3,2,1j , with 1321  qqq . 
Yearly income is a random number drawn from a log-normal distribution specific to the 
employment status. If the i-th individual has an employment status iS , then her/his income is 
drawn from a lognormal distribution with mean )( iS  and standard deviation )( iS : 
[13]  )(),(log~ iii SSnormaly   
Opportunity costs 
The opportunity cost of waiting time per day, ic , depends on individual employment status 
and is defined as a fraction )( iSc  of the income earned in a day: 
[14] 365/)( 0iii yScc   
Each agent bears an opportunity cost of time when waiting for the treatment for a time longer 
than Lit . After time 
L
it  the level of health decreases below a threshold LH  leaving her/him 
unable to perform usual activities and causing a loss of individual income. The value of Lit  is 
computed given the initial health status 0iH  and the threshold LH : 
[15] 
d
LiL
i HH
HHtttt 





minmax
0
minmaxmin )(  
So, if the treatment is obtained at time  , the net yearly income of the i-th agent after the 
treatment is: 
[16] 



 L
i
L
iii
L
ii
i tiftcy
tify
y 

)(
)( 0
0
 
Moreover, income decreases if the treatment is provided by the private sector at a price p, or if 
the public sector charges a copayment Ti, variable according to individual characteristics (i.e. 
chronic conditions or income level)9. 
                                                 
9 The specific characteristics of the copayment will be better clarified in section 3.2.  
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In those cases income is: 
[17] 



 L
i
L
iii
L
ii
i tifptcy
tifpy
py 

)(
),( 0
0
 
[18] 



 L
ii
L
iii
L
iii
ii tifTtcy
tifTy
Ty 

)(
),( 0
0
 
If the agent forgoes the treatment, her/his income decreases only because of opportunity costs, 
if tt Li  : 
[19] 



 L
i
L
iii
L
ii
i ttifttcy
ttify
ty
)(
)0,( 0
0
 
The time profile of net income for the three different situations (public, private, and no 
treatment) is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 - Income time profile 
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If the treatment is not delivered timely, the utility of the agent decreases because of anxiety 
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Anxiety disappears when the individual obtains the treatment, so if the treatment is obtained 
at time   the level of utility is: 
[20]  iii
i
i HyUa
U  ),(),()1(
1
  
We assume furthermore that the individual is not anxious if she/he decides to forgo the 
treatment. The anxiety parameter ia  is a random number drawn from a uniform distribution in 
the range  maxmin ,aa . 
Utility maximisation 
Agents face a problem of maximisation because they can choose among three possible 
situations: 
a) treatment provided by the public service at time PU : 
[21] PUiU =    iPUiiPUii HTyUa PU  ),(),,(1
1
  
b) treatment provided by the private service at time PR : 
[22]    iPRiPRii
PR
i HpyUa
U
PR
 ),(),,(1
1
  
c) no treatment: there are neither benefits nor costs for the treatment and utility is not 
discounted for anxiety. So, if the individual chooses to not demand the treatment, health 
and income are evaluated at time t : 
[23]  iiiNi tHtyUU ),(),0,(  
The maximum level of utility that can be reached by the agent is then: 
[24]  NiPRiPUii UUUU ,,max  
If the maximum level of utility is PUiU , the individual best action is to wait for time PU  in 
order to receive the treatment from the public service paying a copayment iT . This situation is 
depicted in Figure 5a. 
If the maximum level of utility is PRiU , the individual best action is to ask for the treatment 
provided by the private sector, at time PR  and at price p. This situation can be seen in Figure 
5b. 
If the maximum level of utility is è NiU , the individual best action is to renounce to the 
treatment, as in the private sector the treatment is too costly and in the public sector the 
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waiting time is too long (owing to budget constraints in the NHS). This situation is 
represented in Figure 5c. 
 
Figure 5a - The best action is public treatment 
 
 
 
Figure 5b - The best action is private treatment 
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Figure 5c - The best action is no treatment 
 
 
 
3.2 The institutional framework 
As seen above, we assume that the treatment is provided by the private sector at price p or by 
the public sector without charges or with a copayment T, defined as a share of the full price p. 
In both private and public sector the treatment can be provided immediately only if the 
number of treatments asked is lower than the maximum number of treatments that can be 
provided in each period. If the maximum number of treatments that can be provided is not 
sufficient to satisfy all the demanded treatments, then a waiting list will arise. 
The public sector can deal with the excess demand in several ways. We consider three control 
tools of demand for the public treatment: copayment, prioritization (priority classes) and 
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Copayment 
The agents’ access to the public service waiting list can be influenced by the introduction of a 
copayment. The copayment to pay to access the public treatment is defined as a rate T of the 
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financial impact on the agents with a lower stock of health who could derive relatively higher 
benefits from the treatment. These regressive distributional effects of the copayment can be 
reduced if two kinds of exemption are introduced: 
a) exemption for low income:  
[25] 




Li
Li
i yyifT
yyif
T
0
 
where Ly  is the income threshold (a sort of poverty line) below which no copayment must be 
paid. 
b) exemption for chronic conditions and high benefit from the treatment10: 
[26] 
 
otherwiseT
Hif
T PiPii
H   and   0 
 
where PH  is the low health threshold and P  is the high benefit threshold. 
Prioritisation of waiting lists 
Our model considers also a prioritisation scheme modelled as a multiple list system, in which 
lists (classes) are ordered in decreasing level of priority and the number of potential 
treatments are assigned in order to assure lower waiting time to higher priority lists. The 
individual levels of health and of benefit from the treatment determine the priority and the list 
in which the individual is assigned to. We assume that the NHS providing the public 
treatment defines three priority lists, as shown in Table 2 and in Figure 6. 
 
Table 2 - Prioritisation with a multiple list system 
 Health Benefit 
List 1: high priority 
low health – high benefit Pi HH 0  Pi    
List 2: average priority   
low health (and low benefit) Pi HH 0  Pi    
high benefit (and high health) Pi HH 0  Pi    
List 3: low priority 
high health – low benefit Pi HH 0  Pi    
 
                                                 
10 This second type of exemption recalls the so called “value-based cost sharing”, i.e., medical care that is seen to 
provide a higher marginal benefit to the patient should have lower coinsurance rates than medical care with 
lower marginal benefits. Pauly and Blavin (2008) have shown that value-based cost sharing can be justified only 
under asymmetric information (e.g. when patients may decide to forgo preventive care because they do not 
realize its long-term health benefits) and that anyway coinsurance rates must be designed to balance the twin 
goals of risk sharing (considering  the marginal benefit of the treatment) and averting moral hazard. 
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Figure 6 - Prioritisation with a multiple list system 
 
 
Appropriateness 
We also hypothesise that the NHS adopts appropriateness criteria with an explicit rationing of 
patients characterised by lower health care needs, based on EBM considerations. In other 
terms, the public treatment is refused in case of inappropriate demand, defined as a condition 
with both a high level of health ( appri HH 0 ) and a very low expected benefit from the 
treatment ( appri   ), as shown in Table 3 and Figure 7. 
 
Table 3 - Appropriateness criteria 
 Health and benefit 
Appropriate demand appri HH 0  or appri    
Inappropriate demand appri HH 0  and appri    
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Figure 7 - Appropriateness criteria 
 
 
Considering the previous framework, each agent i, according to her/his individual 
characteristics (health status, income, risk aversion, preference for health, expected benefit 
from the treatment, occupational status, opportunity costs, and anxiety), which are randomly 
generated in the model, will choose between three different alternatives (public, private, and 
no treatment) in order to maximise her/his utility. The whole process of individual agents’ 
choice, based on the variables and parameters previously defined, is represented in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the dynamics of the model when all the tools for the control of the demand 
for the public treatment ( appropriateness criteria, prioritisation lists, copayment and rationing 
by waiting times) are considered. 
In each period N agents with all individual characteristics are randomly generated. A fixed 
number of these agents can be treated in the public sector. First, each individual who needs 
health care asks for the public treatment provided by the NHS. The NHS assesses the 
appropriateness of agent’s demand. If the individual demand is considered inappropriate, the 
agent can choose (to maximise her/his utility) either to ask for the private treatment or to 
renounce. 
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Figure 8 - The agent’s choice 
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Figure 9 - Model dynamics 
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If the demand is assessed to be appropriate, the individual is assigned to one of the three waiting 
lists according to her/his health status and expected health benefit from treatment; the maximum 
waiting time for public treatment is precisely defined for list 1 (high priority) and list 2 (average 
priority) while if the agent is assigned to the list 3 (low priority) her/his expected waiting time is 
calculated dividing the current number of agents waiting in list 3 by the daily number of 
treatments for patients in list 3 (if the daily number of treated individuals in lists 1 and 2 were not 
sufficient to guarantee them the defined maximum waiting times, this number would be increased 
with a corresponding reduction of the daily number of treatments provided to patients in list 3). 
In this case, the individual can choose between three different alternatives (public, private, and no 
treatment) in order to maximise her/his utility, considering expected waiting time and copayment 
for public treatment, the price of private alternative, and all the other relevant variables. 
 
3.3 Social welfare 
In order to evaluate from a societal point of view the effects of different tools used to control the 
demand for public treatment in terms of efficiency and equity, now we define: a social evaluation 
function of individual welfare, a social welfare function and a policy efficiency index. 
Social evaluation function of individual welfare and equivalent income 
As we have seen above, each agent makes her/his own choice (private, public, or no treatment) 
considering a personalised utility function that depends upon her/his specific characteristics. In 
order to make a comparison of the utility levels associated to  individual choices, we need only to 
assume ordinality and non comparability across individuals. If we want to obtain a measure of 
social evaluation, instead, we need to assume cardinal and comparable utility levels. 
To this aim, first of all we assume that the collectivity has a social evaluation function of 
individual welfare  ii Hyv ,  that allows to evaluate socially the level of individual welfare by 
means of a unique function. We assume that the social evaluation of individual welfare has the 
functional form of the individual utility function, but uses fixed social parameters   and   set at 
the median value of the distribution of individual parameters: 
[27]       1)1( 1,  HyHyvv iiiii  
The anxiety parameter, associated to the wait for treatment, is also set at the median value of the 
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distribution of individual parameters. 
From the social evaluation function  ii Hyv ,  it is possible to derive a money metric measure of 
individual welfare by defining an equivalent income, e
i
y , that represents the monetary income 
that gives rise to the same level of individual welfare when health is set at a reference level RH : 
[28]    Reiii HyvHyvv i ,,   
If we set RH =1, from     1 )1( 1 Reii Hyv  the i-th agent’s equivalent income is: 
[29]   )1/(1)1(    vy iei  
It is also possible to define a sort of equivalence scale of health by treating the health level as an 
individual characteristics that influences the individual welfare for a given level of income. The 
equivalence scale i  is defined as: 
[30] e
i
i
i y
y  
From the above definitions: 
[31]  
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Therefore, the equivalent income is also equal to: 
[32]  iii
ie
i Hy
yy   
If, for instance, iH =0.5 and  =0.5, the equivalent income is iiei yyy 7071.05.0 2/1  . This 
means that an individual with income iy  and iH =0.5 is as well off as another individual with the 
70.71% of iy  and with iH =1. 
Social welfare 
The aggregate level of welfare can be obtained with a social welfare function based on social 
evaluation of individual welfare, with the usual properties. 
We use the simple utilitarian social welfare function: 
[33]     Ni iiNi i HyvvW 11 ,  
In order to obtain a monetary measure of the social welfare, we use the equally distributed 
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equivalent income EDEy  with a reference level of health RH : 
[34]    Ni REDE HyvW 1 ,  
Considering the social evaluation function [27] and setting RH =1, the equally distributed 
equivalent income is defined as: 
[35]   )1/(1)1(    WyEDE  
Policy efficiency index 
We define a policy efficiency index by comparing the actual social welfare reached in a particular 
institutional setting (simulation) with the maximum potential social welfare: 
[36] 
0max
0
WW
WWE 
  
where W is the actual welfare reached in the simulation, maxW  is the value of social welfare when 
all individuals receive the health benefit i  from the treatment immediately and without costs 
and  0W  is the value of social welfare when nobody is treated within one year. 
By construction, the policy efficiency index ranges from 0 to 1. 
 
4. Results of different simulations of the model 
4.1 Values of parameters and simulations 
Now we present different simulations of the agent-based model described in previous section and 
analyse the related effects in order to obtain some aggregate indicators of the relative 
performance of the policy instruments that could be used to control the demand for the public 
outpatient treatment. 
To this aim, firstly we need to assign specific, and reasonable, values to all the different 
parameters. All the chosen values are reported in Table 4.  
Table 5 summarises the mix of institutional choices of the different simulations performed. 
First of all, to produce some benchmark results, we simulate an institutional framework in which 
there are only private service providers (simulation 01). Then we simulate a situation where the 
outpatient treatment is provided only by the NHS (simulation 02). 
 
 27
Table 4 – Values of parameters used in the simulations 
Parameter Value 
Number of agents 100 
Number of periods 1000 
Relative risk aversion (uniform distribution): range maxmin ,  0.0, 1.0 
Preference for health (uniform distribution): range maxmin ,  0.0, 1.0 
Initial stock of health (uniform distribution): range maxmin , HH  0.1, 1- max  
Benefit from treatment (uniform distribution): range maxmin ,  0, 0.1 
Quality parameter for public treatment:   0.75 
Decay exponent: d 2.0 
Time horizon for utility maximization: t  365 days 
Time to reach the minimum level of health: mint , maxt  3, 7300days 
Anxiety parameter (uniform distribution): range mina , maxa  0.00001, 0.0001 
Employment status (frequency)(*): 321 ,, qqq  0.07, 0.29, 0.64 
Average yearly income by employment status(*): )( iSy  20100, 17300, 13900 € 
Standard deviation of yearly income by employment status(*): )( iS  1.869, 1.700, 1.894 
Poverty line(*): yL (50% of mean income of the overall distribution) 7660 €/year 
Opportunity costs by employment status: )( iSc  0.50, 0.10, 0.00 
Price of private treatment p 200 € 
Copayment for public treatment: T 0.25 p 
Potential daily demand satisfaction rate by public service 30% 
Potential daily demand satisfaction rate by private service 100% 
Priority lists 
 List 1: low health – high benefit 
 List 2: low health and low benefit–high benefit and high health 
 List 3: high health – low benefit 
Max. waiting time by priority list 
List 1: 3 days, 
List 2: 10 days 
List 3: no limit 
Priority thresholds P
H  = 0.2 
P  = 0.9 max  
Appropriateness thresholds 
app  = 0.03 
apprH = 0.7 
Note: (*) The values are drawn from the Bank of Italy Survey on Househlold Income and Wealth - 2008  
 
 
Simulations from A to E represent five extensions of simulation 02 (only public provision). 
Simulations from A to D are obtained combining  different policy tools for the control of demand 
for the public treatment: 
 copayment without exemptions; 
 copayment with exemptions (low income, low health) 
 priority classes; 
 appropriateness criteria. 
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Simulation E considers the simultaneous use of all those instruments of demand control . 
Finally, simulations from F to M repeat previous simulations from A to E considering the 
coexistence of private and public provision of the outpatient treatment. 
 
Table 5 –Simulations 
Copayment 
 Simulation Private sector 
Public 
sector 
(30%) 
C
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t 
(t)
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01 01-priv X - - - - - 
02 02-pub - X - - - - 
A A-pub-t - X X - - - 
B B-pub-tyH - X X X - - 
C C-pub-pr - X - - X - 
D D-pub-appr - X - - - X 
E E-pub-tyH-pr-appr - X X X X X 
F F-pp X X - - - - 
G G-pp-t X X X - - - 
H H-pp-tyH X X X X - - 
I I-pp-pr X X - - X - 
L L-pp-appr X X - - - X 
M M-pp-tyH-pr-appr X X X X X X 
Note: pp = private & public services 
 
 
As an example of how the model works, Figures 10 and 11 show the individual choice (between 
public and private) and the dynamics of the agent-based model with simulation I (coexistence of 
public and private provision, and use of priority lists as the unique tool to control demand by the 
public provider). Figure 10 (a) shows that, within the framework of simulation I, the public 
treatment is mostly chosen by individuals with both high health level and high benefit, while 
some individuals assigned to the list 3 (low priority) decide to renounce to treatment. Figure 10 
(b) shows that public treatment is generally chosen by low income individuals, whatever their 
level of health. Figure 11 (a) shows the average waiting time for each priority list, with the 
average waiting time for list 3 (low priority) converging around 40 days in the long run. Figure 
11 (b) shows how individuals choose between private and public provison in the long run.  
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Figure 10 – Example of individual choice (colour) – Simulation I 
a) health status and potential benefit from the treatment b) health status and income 
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Figure 11 - Example of simulation dynamics – Simulation I 
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4.2 Aggregate effects of policy simulations 
We now examine the results of different simulations as concerns, in particular, waiting times, 
social welfare, income inequality, health inequality, and policy efficiency. 
Table 6 shows the share of individual choices (between public, private, and no treatment) and the 
average characteristics of individuals (income, health level, and benefit from treatment) 
according to the chosen treatment option. The presence of a private alternative to public treatment 
(simulations from F to M) strongly reduces the number of individuals who decide to forgo the 
treatment (in particular in simulation I when only priority lists are used as a way to control the 
demand for public treatment), even though those individuals who demand private treatment are 
(obviously) characterised by a higher average income. In all simulations but one (simulation G)11, 
those agents who decide to forgo the treatment are generally characterised by a lower average 
benefit from treatment and by a better level of health. 
Table 7 reports some interesting results of different simulations also as far as efficiency and 
equity effects are concerned. Generally, the presence of a private alternative (simulations from F 
to M) strongly reduces the lenght of the waiting list and the waiting times for the public 
treatment. Table 7 also reports, for all simulations, the measured variation of different indicators 
(social welfare, average income, average health, income inequality, health inequality, policy 
efficiency ) with respect to a situation of no treatment. Public provision without a private 
alternative slightly reduces income inequality (measured the Atkinson index12), in particular with 
simulations B and D, but in general the presence of private providers increases the agents’ 
welfare and policy efficiency: social welfare, as measured by the equally distributed equivalent 
income defined in [35], increases mostly either when only prioritisation of waiting lists 
(simulation I) or all the demand control tools (simulation M) are applied by public provider; the 
reduction in average income with respect to the “no treatment” situation is lower when a private 
alternative exists and it ranges from -0.7 to -0.8%, independently from the particular tools 
adopted to control the demand for the publicly provided treatment; similarly, the presence of a 
private alternative takes to the higher increase in average health level; health inequality 
                                                 
11 Only in simulation G, the average benefit is slightly higher for the agents that forgo the treatment than for those 
that ask for public treatment. This depends on the rationing effect of the copayment without any exemption. 
12 The Atkinson index of income inequality used is: yyI E /1 , where Nyy N
i i
/
1  , 
     1 11 1 / Nyy Ni iE  and   is the social risk aversion of income from [27]. 
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(measured the Atkinson index13) is strongly reduced with the private alternative in particular with 
simulation M. 
The policy efficiency index, as defined by [36] (see also Figure 14) is very low when there is 
only the public provider, while it increases sharply when the private service is available. The use 
of a mix of direct and indirect tools (copayment corrected with exemptions, priority lists; 
appropriateness criteria) could increase further the efficiency of the system, by lowering waiting 
times and improving equity. 
The increase of social welfare and policy efficiency determined by the presence of a fully paid 
private alternative crucially depends on the assumptions of our model. Firstly, private provision 
reduces waiting list length and waiting times for the public treatment since we hypothesised a 
capacity (budget) constraint for public provision and no (or lower) capacity constraint for the 
private one; it follows that, coeteris paribus, the existence of a private alternative reduces 
congestion in the demand for the public treatment hereby raising social welfare, average health, 
health equality, and policy efficiency. Secondly, we assumed that the private treatment may 
produce an higher individual expected benefit i  than the public one, owing to the possibility for 
the agents to freely choose their preferred physician; this entails that the private treatment, even it 
is fully paid by demanders, generally produces better effects on agents’ health and consequently 
on social welfare and policy efficiency. Anyway, since the assumptions we made seem quite 
reasonable (budget constraints and limits to the individual’s choice of the health care professional 
are common characteristics of public health care systems) we believe that the results of our 
simulations can provide useful insights for health policy. 
Moreover, the results of our simulations point out that, in presence of a private alternative, both 
using only priority lists (simulation I) and using all the tools to control public demand (simulation 
M), seem to produce the best performances in terms of social welfare, average health, health 
equality and policy efficiency. This could suggest two preliminary conclusions: first, it seems 
that using just prioritisation of waiting lists, without any copayment, could represent a 
parsimonious and effective tool to control the demand for public treatment; second, using the 
entire demand control toolkit (including copayments with exemptions) may take to a similar 
                                                 
13 The Atkinson index of health inequality used is: HHI E /1 , where NHH N
i i
/
1  , 
     111 1 / NHH Ni iE  and )1(1    is the social risk aversion of health from [27]. 
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result, but one must take into account that it should entail higher costs than to manage a single 
tool like lists’ prioritisation.  
 
  
Table 6 – Simulation results: average characteristics by individual choice of service 
Simulation 01-priv 02-pub A-pub-t B-pub-tyH C-pub-pr D-pub-appr 
E-pub-
tyH-pr-
appr 
Individual choice 
No service 22.6% 69.8% 69.8% 69.8% 71.5% 69.9% 71.5% 
Public service 0.0% 30.3% 30.2% 30.2% 28.5% 30.1% 28.5% 
Private service 77.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Average income 
No service 10,302 17,451 16,719 17,397 17,928 17,520 17,890 
Public service - 20,014 21,708 20,147 18,975 19,868 19,073 
Private service 20,539 - - - - - - 
Average health 
No service 0.5494 0.5109 0.5124 0.5120 0.5508 0.5197 0.5532 
Public service - 0.4640 0.4604 0.4613 0.3610 0.4434 0.3547 
Private service 0.4813 - - - - - - 
Average benefit 
No service 0.0477 0.0481 0.0482 0.0481 0.0447 0.0472 0.0446 
Public service - 0.0540 0.0537 0.0541 0.0629 0.0562 0.0632 
Private service 0.0505 - - - - - - 
 
Simulation F-pp G-pp-t H-pp-tyH I-pp-prior L-pp-appr M-pp-tyH-pr-appr 
Individual choice 
No service 4.8% 17.7% 6.4% 5.2% 5.8% 7.3% 
Public service 30.1% 29.9% 30.1% 30.1% 30.2% 30.1% 
Private service 65.2% 52.4% 63.5% 64.7% 64.1% 62.6% 
Average income 
No service 16,379 8,847 16,430 16,233 15,208 15,289 
Public service 11,128 16,110 11,204 11,321 11,368 11,500 
Private service 21,635 22,601 21,737 21,597 21,723 21,808 
Average health 
No service 0.6315 0.5359 0.6273 0.6408 0.6791 0.6624 
Public service 0.5426 0.5625 0.5382 0.5175 0.5178 0.5011 
Private service 0.4657 0.4459 0.4639 0.4755 0.4704 0.4752 
Average benefit 
No service 0.0420 0.0478 0.0446 0.0398 0.0349 0.0380 
Public service 0.0477 0.0434 0.0467 0.0511 0.0507 0.0512 
Private service 0.0515 0.0543 0.0519 0.0501 0.0509 0.0507 
Note:  see Table 5 for the description of simulations 
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Table 7 – Aggregate simulations results 
Simulation 01- priv 
02- 
pub 
A- 
pub-t 
B- 
pub-tyH 
C- 
pub-pr 
D- 
pub-appr 
E- 
pub-tyH-
pr-appr 
Lenght of the list* - 8,014 7,422 7,813 2,966 7,858 2,982 
Waiting time (days)* - 268 248 261 327 262 319 
Average income   -1.0% -5.9% -5.7% -5.9% -5.6% -5.9% -5.6% 
Average health   25.4% 1.4% 1.8% 1.5% 8.0% 1.4% 7.9% 
Income inequality   0.2% -0.2% -0.1% -0.2% -0.1% -0.2% -0.1% 
Health inequality   0.3% 10.7% 10.6% 10.6% 2.2% 10.6% 2.3% 
Social welfare   28.0% 1.5% 1.9% 1.7% 10.8% 1.6% 10.8% 
Policy efficiency 85.3% 4.6% 5.8% 5.0% 33.0% 4.8% 32.7% 
 
Simulation  F- pp 
G- 
pp-t 
H- 
pp-tyH 
I- 
pp-prior 
L- 
pp-appr 
M- 
pp-tyH-pr-
appr 
Lenght of the list*  988 305 627 944 839 504 
Waiting time (days)*  33 11 21 40 28 20 
Average income    -0.7% -0.8% -0.8% -0.7% -0.7% -0.8% 
Average health    26.3% 25.7% 26.3% 26.3% 26.3% 26.3% 
Income inequality    0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
Health inequality    -1.1% 0.2% -1.2% -1.3% -1.1% -1.4% 
Social welfare    29.9% 28.4% 29.9% 30.0% 29.9% 30.0% 
Policy efficiency  90.8% 86.5% 90.9% 91.3% 91.0% 91.3% 
Legend: = percentage change with respect to no-treatment * = referred to the low priority class (list 3) 
Note: See Table 5 for the description of simulations 
 
Figure 14 – Policy efficiency index (%) 
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Anyway, these conclusions depend also on the fact that we did not consider the possibility of 
using the copayments’ revenues to fund an increase of the potential daily demand satisfaction rate 
by the public service. We consider this possibility in the next section. 
 
4.3 Effects of a change in the copayment rate with use of revenue 
We consider now only the situation with both public and private service options. There is a 
copayment for the public treatment with both types of exemptions alike in simulation H 
considered in previous section. Now we hypothesise that all the revenues from copayments are 
used to fund the public service14, and look at the effects of increasing the copayment rate from 0 
to 100% of the full price of the treatment p. 15 
Table 8 shows the share of individual choices (between public, private, and no treatment) 
according to different levels of the copayment rate. The higher percentage of individuals 
choosing for public provision is found when the copayment rate for the public treatment is at 
55% of p. This depends on the high level of the daily demand satisfaction rate (50.6%) allowed 
by using copayments revenues to empower the public service (see also Table 9 and Figure 15). A 
further increase of the copayment rate beyond 55% (e.g. at 60%) would determine a decrease in 
the share of agents demanding the public treatment, owing to the reduced differential between 
copayment and full price of private treatment. 
Table 9 shows that (as expected) both the length of waiting list and waiting times for public 
treatment decrease with a copayment rate increase. The highest level of the policy efficiency 
index (91.9%) is reached with a copayment rate of 55%, and this is consistent with previous 
results (see also Figure 16). Therefore, using a 55% copayment with both types of exemptions 
provides a better result in terms of policy efficiency than using either only lists prioritisation 
(simulation I of previous section) or the entire set of tools to control the demand for public 
treatment (simulation M). Finally, it is worth noting that when the copayment revenues are used 
to fund the public provision, applying a moderate copayment rate of 20% - slightly lower than in 
the simulations of previous section - would determine the same result in terms of policy 
efficiency (a 91.3% index) of using only priority lists (simulation I) or using all the tools to 
                                                 
14 In each period the number of public treatment is increased by the ratio between the previous period revenue and 
the price p. For sake of simplicity, we do not consider here the costs of administering exemption schemes which 
reduce the net revenues collected for funding the public service. 
15 When the copayment is set to 0, the results correspond to those of simulation F in Table 7. 
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control public demand (simulation M) when copayment was not considered a funding source for 
public service. 
 
Table 8 – Varying copayment: choice of service 
Simulation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Copayment: 
 % of price 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 
Individual choice 
No service 4.8% 5.0% 5.2% 5.4% 5.6% 5.7% 5.8% 6.1% 6.2% 6.4% 6.6% 
Public service 30.1% 31.0% 32.1% 33.1% 34.5% 35.9% 37.6% 39.3% 41.3% 43.8% 46.7% 
Private service 65.2% 64.0% 62.7% 61.5% 59.9% 58.4% 56.6% 54.6% 52.5% 49.8% 46.8% 
 
Simulation  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Copayment: 
 % of price  55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 
Individual choice 
No service  6.8% 7.2% 7.7% 8.1% 8.5% 8.8% 9.2% 9.5% 9.7% 9.7% 
Public service  50.4% 49.3% 46.4% 43.1% 39.4% 35.3% 30.6% 25.6% 20.3% 13.1% 
Private service  42.8% 43.5% 46.0% 48.9% 52.1% 55.9% 60.2% 64.8% 70.1% 77.2% 
 
Table 9 – Varying copayment: aggregate simulations results 
Simulation 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Copayment:  
% of price 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 
% public 
treatments 30.0% 31.0% 32.0% 33.1% 34.4% 35.9% 37.5% 39.3% 41.5% 44.0% 46.9% 
Lenght of the 
list 988 894 800 712 622 539 453 370 293 218 144 
Waiting time 
(days) 33 29 25 22 19 15 13 10 8 5 4 
Policy 
efficiency 90.8% 91.0% 91.1% 91.2% 91.3% 91.5% 91.7% 91.7% 91.8% 91.8% 91.8% 
 
Simulation  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Copayment: 
 % of price  55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100% 
% public 
treatments  50.6% 49.6% 46.6% 43.3% 39.7% 35.5% 30.8% 25.8% 20.4% 13.1% 
Lenght of the 
list  71 52 47 43 40 35 31 26 20 13 
Waiting time 
(days)  2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Policy 
efficiency  91.9% 91.8% 91.6% 91.4% 91.3% 91.2% 91.1% 91.1% 91.2% 91.3% 
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Figure 15 –Effect of copayment increase on the demand satisfaction rate by the public 
service (% of potential demand) 
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Figure 16 – Effect of Copayment Increase on the Policy Efficiency Index (%) 
90
.8
4% 90
.9
8%
91
.0
6% 91
.2
1% 91
.3
5% 91
.5
1% 91
.6
7%
91
.7
1%
91
.8
1%
91
.8
4%
91
.8
3%
91
.9
3%
91
.7
7%
91
.5
7%
91
.4
3%
91
.2
8%
91
.2
1%
91
.1
2%
91
.1
0%
91
.1
7% 91
.3
2%
90%
91%
91%
92%
92%
93%
93%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
copayment (% of full price)
 
 
 37
Summing up, funding the public service with the revenues from copayments, corrected with 
exemption schemes, can reduce public supply constraints thereby increasing social welfare and 
policy efficiency.16 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we use an agent-based model to analyse the impact of two direct tools (rationing 
through waiting times and cost-sharing) and two indirect tools (appropriateness and priority 
criteria) to control the demand for a public outpatient service provided by a National Health 
Service in presence of a fully paid out-of-pocket private alternative. In particular, we present a 
model where heterogeneous agents maximise their individual utility based on income, health 
level, and other individual characteristics such as risk aversion and the relative preference for 
health with respect to income. On this basis, we develop some computational experiments based 
on micro-simulations providing some preliminary results potentially useful in terms of health 
care policy.  
First, our preliminary analysis shows that the presence of a private alternative to public treatment 
can improve social welfare and health equity in a NHS, when public supply is constrained by a 
fixed budget and longer waiting times than the private one. In absence of a private alternative, 
agents characterised by high opportunity-costs of time and high health decay rates could decide 
to give up the treatment if the waiting time overcomes a critical threshold. 
Second, the analysis confirms that using only waiting times as a direct tool to control the demand 
for a public service is less efficient and equitable in terms of health distribution than adopting one 
or a mix of direct and indirect tools such as: i) a copayment corrected with exemptions; ii) 
priority lists; iii) appropriateness criteria. In particular, using only the second tool, i.e. 
prioritisation of waiting lists without any copayment, may produce high performances in terms of 
social welfare, health equality and policy efficiency; therefore it could represent a parsimonious 
and effective tool to control the demand for public treatment. 
Finally, funding the public service with the revenues from copayments, corrected with exemption 
schemes, can reduce public supply constraints, thereby increasing social welfare and policy 
                                                 
16 These effects could be reinforced if the private alternative is provided “intramoenia” (i.e. “inside the walls of 
public hospitals”) with a part of private revenues allocated to fund the public facility, as in Italy. In this case, 
however, the condition of  perfect separation between public and private provision processes must be fulfilled as 
pointed out by Iversen (1997). 
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efficiency. In this case, applying a moderate copayment rate as a tool to control public demand 
could determine the same result, in terms of policy efficiency, of using only priority lists. 
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